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Insurance 
by Robert A. Seligson* 
Insurance Defense Counsel-His Obligations and Rights 
Possibly the most important decision in the insurance field 
in 1968 involved not the rights and obligations of an insurance 
carrier per se but rather those of an attorney selected by the 
carrier to protect and defend its insured. In Lysick v. 
Walcom,l the appellate court held that an attorney who is 
employed by an insurance company to defend an action arising 
out of an accident involving an insured represents both the 
insured and the insurer and owes to both a high duty of care 
imposed both by statute and the rules governing professional 
conduct. 
* A.B. 1954, Brown University. LL.B. 
1957, University of California School 
of Law, Berkeley. Partner: Bledsoe, 
Smith, Cathcart, Johnson, and Rogers. 
Member, State Bar of California. 
The author extends his appreciation 
to David A. Lawson III, student at 
Golden Gate College, School of Law, 
for assistance in preparation of this 
article. 
1. 258 Cal. App.2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 
406 (1968). For a further discussion of 
this case, see Moreau, TORTS, in this 
volume. 
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Where a conflict of interest arises between the insured and 
the insurer the attorney is not necessarily required to withdraw 
from the case, or terminate his relationship with one client or 
the other, although he may choose to do so. He may represent 
dual interests as long as there is full consent and full dis-
closure. Where counsel represents two clients of conflicting 
or divergent interests, he must disclose all facts and circum-
stances which, in the judgment of a lawyer of ordinary skill 
and capacity, are necessary to enable his clients to make free 
and intelligent decisions regarding the subject matter of the 
representation. The attorney is liable to the client who suffers 
loss caused by the failure of the attorney to make full dis-
closure. An insurer is required to exercise good faith in set-
tling a claim where there is great risk of recovery beyond 
the policy limits and where settlement is the most reasonable 
manner of disposing of the claim. This rule however applies 
to the insurance company and not to the attorney, who is not 
a party to the insurance contract. His obligations are gov-
erned by the established standards of professional ethics, which 
have as their guideposts the elements of good faith and fidelity 
to his client. The attorney may be employed with respect 
to all matters associated with the claim, or he may be employed 
solely for the defense in court. Where the attorney properly 
represents only the insurance company in the matter of settle-
ment, it is his duty to make that clear to the insured. If he 
does so, he has no obligation to give proper consideration to 
the interests of the insured in his recommendations with respect 
to the settlement of the case. However, where counsel does 
not advise the insured that he is acting solely for the insurer 
in the matter of settlement, his duty includes the representa-
tion of the insured in that respect, including the obligation 
to attempt to effectuate a reasonable settlement as the most 
reasonable manner of disposing of the action. 
In Lysick the court held that counsel, who had not limited 
his obligation to the insured in the manner set forth above, 
was negligent as a matter of law: (1) in failing to notify the 
insured of settlement offers and demands; (2) in failing to 
take positive and timely steps to urge and advise the insurer 
to make settlement to the full amount of the policy; and (3) in 
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failing to advise the insured of action which the insured might 
take. The court reversed judgment for defendant with direc-
tions to re-try the single issue of proximate cause. The court 
noted that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury 
could determine that the conduct of the attorney was not a 
proximate cause of the damage caused to the insured by 
reason of the failure of the insurer to settle the claim within 
policy limits. It was further stated that the sole proximate 
cause of the insured's loss could have been the breach of duty 
of good faith on the part of the insurer, where the insurer 
withheld the authority to settle the claim for policy limits 
until it was too late for the insured to pay any settlement 
proposal offered some months before trial and gave equivocal 
instructions regarding settlement to the attorney at various 
times prior to trial. 
The writer believes that this case is important for the courses 
which the court indicated that defense counsel may now follow. 
(Caveat, however: following the court of appeal's decision, 
the case was settled; and the supreme court may not agree with 
either the Lysick decision or this writer's interpretation of that 
decision.) Where there is a coverage problem, and the com-
pany has hired two counsel-one for the coverage problem 
and one to defend the injury action-counsel defending the 
injury action may limit his obligation by advising both the 
insurer and the insured that he will not take part in settle-
ment negotiations. Counsel representing the insurer in the 
coverage dispute may and should handle the settlement nego-
tiations, so as to remove counsel defending the injury case 
from what at best is an embarrassing, although permissible 
situation. 
Where there is no coverage problem and only one defense 
attorney is involved, then counsel may limit his authority and 
obligation by advising the insured that he represents only the 
insurer with respect to settlement negotiations. The insured 
should certainly be told that he may and probably should, at 
his own expense, retain counsel to advise him with respect 
to the question of settlement. Of course, counsel must keep 
the insured fully informed concerning negotiations, so that 
CAL LAW 1969 495 
3
Seligson: Insurance
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969
Insurance 
the insured may take whatever action he deems proper to 
protect his own interests. 
Automobile Insurance 
Exclusions of Specifically Named Individuals 
For a number of years the California courts and legislature 
have engaged in a continuing battle over the right of auto-
mobile liability insurance carriers to limit their coverage with 
respect to persons using the vehicle with the owner's permis-
sion. This struggle was initiated by the supreme court's 
decision in Wildman v. Government Employees' Ins. CO.,2 
where the court held that public policy required that coverage 
be afforded to permissive users. Following this landmark 
decision, which among other results invalidated class exclu-
sions such as those purporting to exclude drivers under and 
over certain ages3 and use exclusions,4 the legislature made 
several attempts to alter, modify and repeal the rule of the 
Wildman case.5 However, the court so construed the legis-
lative amendments as to render them ineffective. 6 This was 
accomplished through the technique of statutory construction; 
and certainly the language chosen by the legislature could 
have been more precise and to the point. 
In 1963, however, practitioners in the field honestly felt 
that the legislature had explicitly set forth the policy of the 
state in terms which even the courts could not deny. In that 
year the requirements for a non-certified motor vehicle liabil-
ity policy, that is the normal automobile policy issued to the 
great preponderance of the public,7 were removed from the 
2. 48 Cal.2d 31, 307 P.2d 359 
(1957). 
3. See American Automobile Ins. Co. 
v. Republic Indemnity Co., 52 Cal.2d 
507, 341 P.2d 675 (1959); Cassin v. 
Financial Indemnity Co., 160 Cal. App. 
2d 631, 325 P.2d 228 (1958). 
4. See Exchange Casualty & Surety 
Co. v. Scott, 56 Cal.2d 613, 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 897, 364 P.2d 833 (1961). 
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5. See, e.g., 1957 amendment of 
former Vehicle Code § 415(a); 1959 en-
actment of Vehicle Code §§ 16450 and 
16451. 
6. See e.g., Interinsurance Exchange 
etc. Southern Cal v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 
58 Cal.2d 142, 23 Cal. Rptr. 592, 373 
P.2d 640 (1962). 
7. A certified policy is one that is 
issued following an accident to satisfy 
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Vehicle Code and placed in the Insurance Code; and Insur-
ance Code section 11580.1 was adopted which specifically 
provided in subsection (e): 
Notwithstanding the foregoing subdivisions, the insurer 
and any named insured may, by the terms of such policy 
or by a separate writing, agree that coverage under the 
policy shall not apply while said motor vehicles are being 
used by a natural person or persons designated by name. 
Such agreement by any named insured shall be binding 
upon every insured to whom such policy applies. 
Thus, it was thought that while, generally speaking, a motor 
vehicle liability policy had to provide coverage for permissive 
users, the insurer and the named insured could agree that 
coverage would not be afforded under the policy for "a nat-
ural person or persons designated by name." This was de-
signed to cover the situation where the carrier might be per-
fectly willing to cover the parents but was unwilling to volun-
tarily grant coverage to the wild teenage son who was known 
to be a bad risk. If the son wanted coverage, he would 
presumably have to obtain coverage through the Assigned 
Risk Plan. 
The case of Abbott v. Interinsurance ExchangeS demon-
strated once again the refusal of the courts to allow any water-
ing down of the Wildman principle. Mr. and Mrs. Abbott 
had a policy with Interinsurance Exchange which covered 
the automobile in question. However, their son "had pre-
viously had difficulties with his driving and the parents had 
signed an endorsement added to the policy which stated that 
the insurance would not be effective while their son was using 
the car in question."9 As might be expected, they neverthe-
less permitted their son to use the car; and an accident oc-
curred. The court held that the endorsement was against 
public policy, notwithstanding Insurance Code section 
11580.1 (e); and that the company was required to defend 
the requirements of the Financial Re-
sponsibility Laws contained in Vehicle 
Code §§ 16250-16503. 
32 
8. 260 Cal. App.2d 528, 67 Cal. Rptr. 
220 (1968). 
9. 260 Cal. App.2d at 530, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. at 221. 
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the Abbots and pay the possible judgment in favor of the 
injured third party. Then, in an amazing piece of legal reason-
ing, the court held that if the company had to pay the injured 
person, it was entitled to be indemnified by Mr. and Mrs. 
Abbott. 
The supreme court denied a hearing in the Abbott case; 
and, accordingly, the decision became final. The decision 
could make it more difficult for parents with teenage children 
to obtain automobile insurance in this State; and individuals 
who are good risks themselves and were formerly able to 
obtain coverage at regular rates might have to resort to the 
Assigned Risk Plan because of the risk presented by their 
children. Companies which were still willing to issue cover-
age might have second thoughts about extending more than 
the minimum required coverage. Finally, parents who had 
limited statutory liability under Vehicle Code sections 17151 
and 17709 could conceivably find their life savings wiped out 
because of their obligation to indemnify the insurer for the 
full amount paid out to the injured party. 
In this last connection, it should be noted that parents 
would have to face the following dilemna: If they wanted and 
were able to obtain large limits to cover the risk of their driv-
ing, they would have to indemnify the carrier for the entire 
loss if their child had an accident. On the other hand, if they 
wished to restrict the amount of their indemnity liability to 
their statutory obligations, they might be compelled to accept 
minimum limits which would not adequately cover them for 
their own accidents. Perhaps, however, this difficult decision 
will not be imposed on people confronted with the problem of 
a bad risk in the family. Following Abbott, the legislature 
was swift to react; and it amended Insurance Code section 
11580.1 (e) to provide: 
Notwithstanding the foregoing subdivisions or the provi-
sions of Article 2 (commencing with Section 16450), 
Chapter 3, Division 7 of the Vehicle Code, the insurer 
and any named insured may, by the terms of such policy 
or by a separate writing, agree that coverage under the 
policy shall not apply, nor accrue to the benefit of the in-
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sured or any third party claimant, while said motor ve-
hicles are being used by a natural person or persons 
designated by name. Such agreement by any named in-
sured shall be binding upon every insured to whom such 
policy applies and upon every third party claimant. 
The object of this amendment is quite clear-namely; to 
nullify the result of the Abbott case and restore to insurers 
what the legislature felt that it had provided in 1963, the right 
to exclude a person or persons designated by name. However, 
in view of the long history of action and counteraction by 
our courts and legislature, it remains to be seen whether the 
1968 amendment will be honored and applied in the courts of 
this State. 
Cancellation of Policy 
The public's complaints about unwarranted and unreason-
able cancellation of automobile liability insurance policies 
have resulted in considerable legislation restricting the right of 
carriers to cancel such policies. In 1968 the legislature re-
pealed the former law on this subject and adopted new sections 
660-667 of the Insurance Code. Among other things, this 
legislation provides that any policy which has been in effect 
for more than 60 days, may be cancelled only for nonpayment 
of premium or the suspension or revocation of the driver's 
license or motor vehicle registration of the named insured or 
any other operator who either resides in the same household or 
customarily operates an automobile insured under the policy. 
Section 663 contains restrictions and requirements upon the 
insurer which does not desire to renew the policy. Section 665 
requires that the company notify the named insured of his 
possible eligibility for insurance through the Assigned Risk 
Plan. 
Hopefully, these restrictions will curb abuses which may 
have existed in the past. The writer wonders when the Legis-
lature will enact similar legislation with respect to fire insur-
ance policies. The public cannot condone the wholesale or 
even widespread cancellation of fire policies in ghetto areas. 
Reasonable regulations should be adopted to insure that the 
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owner of property has the coverage which he needs and which 
he thought he had obtained. If the carrier has agreed to fur-
nish a three or five year policy, it should not be permitted carte 
blanche to cancel the policy without sufficient and socially 
acceptable reasons. In the absence of such justification, such 
as non-payment of premium or increase in risk through change 
in conditions over which the owner has control, the insurer 
should be bound to honor the commitment it made when it 
accepted the risk and issued the policy. 
Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
Uninsured motorist cases accounted, as usual, for a great 
number of decisions. Several of these cases involved the ques-
tion of whether or not the court or the arbitrator should de-
termine if the insured automobile had any physical contact 
with the alleged phantom vehicle, which is a prerequisite for 
coverage under Insurance Code section 11580.2 (b). The 
decisions appear to be hopelessly in conflict. 
In Page v. Insurance Company of North America/o plain-
tiff sued his own uninsured motorist carrier, alleging that in a 
three-car collision, a car driven by a Doe caused Pickell 
to collide with plaintiff's vehicle. Judgment of dismissal fol-
lowing the sustaining of a demurrer was affirmed. The court 
rejected plaintiff's argument that the Doe car was an "unin-
sured motor vehicle", since Insurance Code section 11580.2 
(b) requires physical contact with the automobile whose owner 
or operator is unknown. In the absence of such contact, mere 
proximate causation is insufficient. Yet, in Esparza v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company/l the court re-
versed an order denying arbitration of an uninsured motorist 
claim notwithstanding that both the policy and Insurance 
Code section 11580.2(b) required "physical contact" with 
respect to a "hit and run automobile" and there was no 
physical contact between the two cars. The court held 
that the arbitration provision of the policy was "a broad agree-
ment to arbitrate the liability of the insurance company to its 
10. 256 Cal. App.2d 374, 64 Cal. 11. 257 Cal. App.2d 496, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 89 (1967). Rptr. 245 (1967). 
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insured and that the question whether the insured could re-
cover in the absence of contact with the hit and run vehicle 
was itself an issue subject to arbitration. This case appears 
to be in conflict with Farmers v. Ruiz/2 Key Insurance Ex-
change v. Biagini/3 and Commercial Insurance Company v. 
Copeland,14 which held that the only issues to be determined 
by arbitration are (1) the liability of the uninsured motorist 
to the insured and (2) damages. Esparza was then followed 
in American Insurance Company v. Gernand/5 where it was 
held that the trial court had erred in granting a preliminary in-
junction restraining arbitration where it found no physical 
contact between the unidentified vehicle and either the insured 
vehicle or a third vehicle. Once again, this was held to be an 
issue for the arbitrator. But in Pacific Automobile Insurance 
Company v. Lang/6 the court held in line with the Copeland 
and Ruiz cases that the trial court had erred in accepting the 
arbitrator's determination as to physical contact. It was a 
question for the court to determine whether the arbitrator had 
jurisdiction to proceed; and the court should have made its 
own factual determination of this matter. 
Under these decisions, there appears to be ample authority 
for whatever position one wants to take. Hopefully, the su-
preme court will resolve this conflict in the near future. 
The legislature also addressed itself to the subject of unin-
sured motorist coverage. As reported in last year's volume, 
in Lopez v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company/7 the court 
struck down a provision excluding from uninsured motorist 
coverage a relative who owned an automobile. The court 
held this provision to be void as conflicting with the applicable 
statute, stating that the argument that it was reasonable to 
exclude one who did not insure his own car "would better be 
addressed to the Legislature." This suggestion was accepted; 
and, accordingly, Insurance Code section 11580.2 was 
12. 250 Cal. App.2d 741, 59 Cal. 15. 262 Cal. App.2d -, 68 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. 13 (1967). 810 (1968). 
13. 250 Cal. App.2d 143, 58 Cal. 16. 265 Cal. App.2d -,71 Cal Rptr. 
Rptr. 408 (1967). 637 (1968). 
14. 248 Cal. App.2d 561, 56 Cal. 17. 250 Cal. App.2d 210, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 794 (1967). Rptr. 243 (1967). 
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amended to provide that uninsured motorist coverage does not 
apply "to bodily injury of an insured while occupying a motor 
vehicle owned by an insured, unless the occupied vehicle is an 
insured motor vehicle." 
No longer may one obtain uninsured motorist coverage 
for all his cars by paying the premium for only one automobile. 
Homeowner's Insurance 
Pacific Employers Revisited 
In Cal Law Trends and Developments-i967, this writer 
discussed at some length the supreme court's decision in Pa-
cific Employers insurance Company v. Maryland Casualty 
Company/8 and pointed out that following that decision, nu-
merous claims had been made that homeowner's policies, 
which offered what was thought to be limited automobile 
coverage for the "premises and the ways immediately adjoin-
ing" were, by virtue of the legal legerdemain utilized in the 
opinion, converted into automobile policies furnishing cover-
age for accidents occurring miles away from the insured's 
premises. In the past year, superior courts throughout the 
state refused to accept these claims and held instead that 
homeowner's policies, intended primarily as protection for 
household risks, do not afford coverage for automobile acci-
dents away from the home. 
At the present time, the writer knows of eleven superior 
court decisions in favor of the homeowner's carrier. Most of 
these decisions have gone to the nitty-gritty of contract law, 
the intention of the parties; and they have refused to impose 
coverage that was not bargained for and for which no premium 
was paid. In so doing, the writer believes that the courts have 
followed the supreme court's admonition in Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage/9 in which Chief Jus-
tice Traynor declared: 
In this state, however, the intention of the parties as ex-
18. 65 Cal.2d 318, 54 Cal. Rptr. 385, 442 P.2d 641 (1968). For further dis-
419 P.2d 641 (1966). cussion of this case, see Harvey, EVI-
19. 69 Cal.2d -, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, DENCE, in this volume. 
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pressed in the contract is the source of contractual rights 
and duties. A court must ascertain and give effect to 
this intention by determining what the parties meant by 
the words they used.20 
At this writing, there is no California appellate court de-
cision on the subject; but if the intention of the parties is to be 
determined, honored and applied, the writer feels that the 
superior court rulings will be affirmed and coverage will not be 
imposed upon the homeowner's carrier which neither under-
wrote the risk of automobiles away from the premises nor col-
lected a premium for such risk. 
Finally, it should be noted that here too the legislature has 
taken action. In 1968 subsection (g) was added to Insurance 
Code section 11580.1 to provide: 
Nothing in this section nor in Section 16057 or 16450 
of the Vehicle Code shall be construed to constitute a 
homeowner's policy as an 'automobile liability policy' 
within the meaning of Section 16057 of said code nor 
as a 'motor vehicle liability policy' within the meaning 
of Secton 16450 of said code, notwithstanding that such 
homeowner's policy may provide automobile or motor 
vehicle liability coverage on insured premises or the ways 
immediately adjoining. For the purposes of this section, 
'homeowner's policy' means an insurance policy provid-
ing fire and other insurances covering either residence 
properties occupied by not more than four families and 
appurtenances, or the contents thereof other than mer-
chandise, or both. 
Certainly, for cases arising after the effective date of the 
statute, this should solve the problem. As to cases arising 
prior to the statute, it should be noted that while the statute 
does not provide that it is retroactive, it does purport to be 
a statute of construction and also appears to announce that 
public policy does not require holding a homeowner's policy 
to be an automobile policy for accidents away from the home. 
20. 69 Cal.2d at -, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 
564, 442 P.2d at 644. 
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Fire Insurance 
After what appears to have been considerable debate, the 
supreme court handed down its long-awaited decision on 
re-hearing in Reichert v. General Insurance Company of 
America. l The assured claimed that because of the refusal 
of his fire insurance carriers to promptly adjust and settle his 
loss due to a fire, he lost possession of his property and was 
subsequently adjudicated a bankrupt. He sued not just for 
the fire damage to his motel but also for all consequential 
damage flowing from the breach as well as punitive damages. 
In its initial opinion, the court held that the complaint stated 
a cause of action and that demurrers had been wrongfully sus-
tained without leave to amend. However, the court then 
granted a re-hearing; and by a 4-3 decision reversed itself 
and held that plaintiff's causes of action constituted "rights 
of action arising under contract" which passed to plaintiff's 
trustee in bankruptcy, so plaintiff had no right to assert such 
claims himself. 
In a strong dissent, Justice Peters takes issue with the 
technical basis of the majority's decision and also discusses 
the substantive question with which the majority did not deal, 
namely, whether an insured may recover damages caused by 
bankruptcy which result from the wrongful conduct of an 
insurer in failing to pay a fire loss. Justices Peters, Tob-
riner, and Mosk give an emphatic "yes" to that question in 
language reminiscent of Justice Peters' opinion in Crisci v. 
Security Insurance Company.2 In compelling language, which 
the writer feels will be accepted as the law of this state in 
time to come, the dissenting justices state: 
Where the owner of a heavily mortgaged motel or other 
business property suffers a substantial fire loss, the owner 
may be placed in financial distress, may be unable to 
meet his mortgage payments, and may be in jeopardy 
of losing his property and becoming a bankrupt. A 
1. 68 Cal.2d 822, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321, 2. 66 Cal.2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 
442 P.2d 377 (1968). For a further 426 P.2d 173 (1967). 
discussion of this case, see York, REM-
EDIES, in this volume. 
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major, if not the main, reason why a businessman pur-
chases fire insurance is to guard against such eventualities 
if his property is damaged by a fire. Certainly, the prop-
erty owner who purchases fire insurance may reasonably 
expect that if a fire occurs, the insurance proceeds will be 
promptly available to protect him from those eventu-
alities. The business of the fire insurer is to provide 
such protection. Insurers are, of course, chargeable 
with knowledge of the basic reasons why fire insurance 
is purchased, and of the likelihood that an improper 
delay in payment may result in the very injuries for 
which the insured sought protection by purchasing the 
policies.3 
The dissent also points out that money is not always avail-
able in the market and that consequential damages are not 
always too remote to be proximately caused by a delay in pay-
ment. Certainly, tight money conditions existing in recent 
times demonstrate that that is true; and the writer believes 
that the fire insurance carrier which wrongfully refuses to 
promptly pay a legitimate fire claim may find that its ex-
posure is far greater than the amount of the damage to the 
property. 
Comprehensive Liability Policy: Products Hazard Exclusion 
The advent and increase in products liability cases have 
brought with them corresponding problems in insurance law. 
In the past year, the Supreme Court decided an important case 
dealing with the "products hazard" exclusion found in most 
comprehensive general liability policies. In Insurance Com-
pany of North America v. Electronic Purification Company,4 
the insured was engaged in the business of selling, leasing and 
installing water purification machines, called Nion Generators. 
It leased a Nion Generator to a motel for one year. Prior 
to the installation by the insured's part-time employee, the 
3. 68 Cal.2d at 849, 69 Cal. Rptr. 4. 67 Cal.2d 679, 63 Cal. Rptr. 382, 
at 337, 442 P.2d at 393. 433 P.2d 174 (1967). 
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insured suggested that the motel pool be acid-washed to rid 
it of algae. While so washing the pool, the insured's em-
ployee replaced an underwater light. Upon completion, the 
employee installed the Nion Generator, filled the pool with 
water and left the job. The next day a small boy was fatally 
injured from an electric shock. A wrongful death complaint 
was filed against the insured and the motel owners, alleging 
that they negligently, carelessly and recklessly installed the 
electric wiring leading to the submerged light fixture. The in-
sured's comprehensive multiple liability policy contained 
"products hazard" exclusions for (1) products manufactured, 
sold, handled or distributed by the insured and (2) completed 
operations. 
The court found the exclusions inapplicable on two grounds. 
Initially, the "products" exclusion did not apply to property 
that had been rented, rather than sold, to others. The 
"operations" exclusion was to be read in conjunction with 
the "products" exclusion and was, therefore, also inapplicable 
to products which had been rented. Alternatively, noting 
that the electrocution may have occurred from negligence in 
the acid-washing and installation of the flood lights, the court 
felt that it was not the intent of the insured to exclude cover-
age for this service found to be independent of the installation 
of the Nion Generator. In noting that a liberal interpretation 
of the "completed operations" exclusion would destroy the 
insured's principal objective in purchasing insurance, the court 
sounded a clarion call for clarity in insurance policies, stating: 
The instant case presents yet another illustration of the 
dangers of the present complex structuring of insurance 
policies. Unfortunately the insurance industry has be-
come addicted to the practice of building into policies 
one condition or exception upon another in the shape of a 
linguistic Tower of Babel. We join other courts in 
decrying a trend which both plunges the insured into a 
state of uncertainty and burdens the judiciary with the 
task of resolving it. We reiterate our plea for clarity and 
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simplicity in policies that fulfill so important a public 
service.5 
As one who has wrestled with language inserted into policies 
by people who obviously never try cases dealing with the words 
they use, the writer joins Justice Tobriner in his plea for 
clarity and simplicity. On the other hand, the writer decries 
those decisions where ambiguity is sought and found simply 
as a vehicle for a desired result. In the words of an ancient 
Chinese seer, "ambiguity lies in the eyes of the beholder and 
some people are blind." 
5. 67 Cal.2d at 691, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
at 390, 433 P.2d at 182. 
• 
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